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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
The central question of this thesis regards to what extent the European Space Agency 
(ESA) and its predecessors, the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and 
the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), have affected the construction of a 
European collective identity.  ELDO, ESRO and the ESA have engaged in a process of 
persuading European states that using space science to construct a European collective 
identity is in their interest.  Using Martha Finnemore’s and Kathryn Sikkink’s model for the 
life cycle of a norm,1 a constructivist analysis of European space policy history suggests that 
the promotion of a European approach to space activities among European states to construct 
a collective identity has reached a middle stage where the idea of “Europe” still evokes 
controversy, but where key states and institutions support and attempt to socialize the norm.  
Internalization of a European identity is not inevitable, however, for the presence of 
competing norms threatens to halt or reverse the socialization process. 
 A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the impact of the European Union 
(EU) on collective European identity, and rightfully so.  Echoing the process of nationalism, 
the EU attempted to use citizenship as a means to inculcate collective identity.  In November, 
1993, the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, officially granting the citizens of EU member 
states “European citizenship,”2 which launched vigorous study whether Europeans truly saw 
themselves a “citizens” in the national sense (in fact, they did not3).  Although citizenship 
was only one of several strategies the EU used to foster the idea of “Europe,” this example 
                                                 
1
 Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink.  1998.  “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”  
International Organization.  Vol 52, No 4.  pp. 887-917. 
2
 Shore, Cris.  2000.  Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration.  London, England: 
Routledge.  p. 66. 
3
 Shore.  2000.  p. 67. 
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suggests that the old ways of constructing identity may be insufficient to build the new 
Europe.  Alternatives must be considered, and there are compelling reasons to look to the 
European space program.   
The link between European space activities and European collective identity is worth 
exploring for several reasons.  While it is difficult to imagine a system that is not dominated 
by the nation-state, it is extraordinary that, only 64 years after a world war that tore the 
region apart, 47%4 of Europeans now find a common identity with millions of people they 
could never know.  In truth, it is unlikely any single influence made this a reality, but it is 
logical to suppose that space science could have contributed to this end.  “The importance 
given science as a medium for cooperation among peoples”5 implies it could serve as an 
unguent for a region as diverse as Europe.  History suggests that space possesses a strongly 
international and cooperative character.  In spite of the highly competitive space race 
between America and the Soviet Union, in 1975, astronauts and cosmonauts docked their 
respective spacecraft to each other in orbit, and shook hands as they toured each other’s 
vehicles.  In Europe, space institutions have existed for nearly fifty years, and it is worth 
examining whether they have been ascribed any meaning in that time.  Because the region 
has been so defined by nationalism historically, however, it will be necessary for a common 
identity to be built.  This is where constructivism is a compelling theoretical approach. 
Limiting the field of study to European space policy is useful in a discussion of 
European identity.  While a complete discussion of the topic necessitates consideration of 
more than simply space policy, limiting the analysis as such provides for a temporally 
                                                 
4
 Eurobarometer.  2004.  “Eurobarometer 62:  Public Opinion in the European Union.”  TNS Opinion & Social.  
p. 94.   
5
 Frutkin, Arnold.  1965.  International Cooperation in Space.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  p. 10. 
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bounded, known quantity of material.  Represented in the sample of European space states is 
a full spectrum of military, economic and cultural influence known to the region, and space 
policy has an impact on all these spheres.  Furthermore, a discussion of space policy directly 
reflects the increasing role technology plays in foreign policy.  A focus on space policy 
eliminates from consideration several states which participate in the EU, but not in the ESA, 
and vice versa.  While this is somewhat damaging to generalizeability, many of the 
expansion countries for both the EU and the ESA have only entered the fold in the last 
decade, whereas cooperation in the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
ELDO/ESRO goes back to the 1960s (and earlier for the EEC). 
 Finnemore and Sikkink’s model for the life cycle of a norm delineates concrete 
markers to measure the progress of European space science in constructing a European 
identity.  The authors define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a 
given identity.”6  The standard for behavior promoted by ESRO, ELDO and ESA has been 
the appropriateness of a European approach to space policy.  European states that believe 
they ought to behave qua Europe will produce a different set of policies than states which 
pursue space policy purely with self-interest in mind.  This behavior extends beyond the 
region, for a group of states which behave in the capacity of Europe will be regarded as 
Europe by the international community.  For a norm to reach the point where it constrains 
behavior, however, it must undergo a process of increasing acceptance. 
 There are three stages in the life of a norm.  The first stage is “norm emergence.”  
New norms are brought forward by individuals or groups Finnemore and Sikkink refer to as 
                                                 
6
 Finnemore and Sikkink.  1998.  p. 891. 
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“norm entrepreneurs,” who attempt to persuade states to adopt the norm.7  Increasingly, 
modern institutions use expertise and information to promote new norms.8  These kinds of 
institutions are referred to as epistemic communities, which Peter Haas defines as “a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”9  
Epistemic communities played an important role in the development of the European space 
program, and shall received greater mention in Chapter Two.   
New norms always enter into a realm of debate, 10 where they must either supplant or 
find a place beside existing norms.  The chief responsibility of norm entrepreneurs is to 
persuade a “critical mass” of states to adopt the norm.11  This means either they have to 
persuade a sufficient proportion of states, or persuade the most important states to adopt the 
norm.12  At this “tipping point,” the norm enters the second stage of its life, the “norm 
cascade,” during which the adoptive states, possibly assisted by the norm entrepreneurs, 
begin the process of “socializing” the norm.13  “Socialization is the main mechanism through 
which norm leaders persuade others to adhere to the norm,”14 where “others” may refer to 
other states, or the citizens of the adoptive states.  In this stage, other states may begin to 
adopt the norm even in the absence of coercion.15   
                                                 
7
 Ibid, p. 895. 
8
 Ibid, p. 899. 
9
 Haas, Peter.  1992.  “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.”  
International Organization.  Vol. 46, No. 1.  p. 3. 
10
 Finnemore and Sikkink.  1998.  p. 897. 
11
 Ibid, p. 901. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid, p. 895. 
14
 Ibid, p. 902. 
15
 Ibid. 
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Progression to the third stage depends entirely on the success of the strategies 
adoptive states use to socialize the norm.16  The third stage, “internalization,” “occurs when 
the norm becomes so accepted that conformance with the norm is almost automatic.”17  The 
main contention of this thesis is that behavior as Europe has advanced to the second stage in 
the life cycle of the norm.  As the norm cycle advances to internalization, it aids the 
construction of a collective identity.  The concept of “collective identity” requires greater 
explanation.     
To Neil Fligstein, “[c]ollective identities refer to the idea that a group of people 
accept a fundamental and consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst 
themselves (Thernborn, 1995: ch. 12; Brubaker and Cooper 2000).  ‘This sense of collective 
identity is socially constructed, by which I mean that it emerges as the intentional or 
unintentional consequence of social interactions.’”18  This is the basis for the link between 
European behavior and collective European identity.  When European individuals behave as 
Europeans, they come to identify as Europeans as they have achieved a fundamental 
similarity and sense of solidarity through common behavior.  Any level of solidarity in 
Europe is significant.  For the last 150 years, nationalism has been a prime mover of the 
region.19  A European common identity has been forced to grow from essentially nothing; 
coming out of World War II, a European in-group simply did not exist.  The idea of 
“Europe” will have become legitimized when European behavior becomes so uncontroversial 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, pp. 902-3. 
17
 Ibid, p. 904. 
18
 Fligstein, Neil.  2008.  Euroclash.  New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  p. 127. 
19
 Jacobs, Dirk, and Robert Maier.  1998.  “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction.”  In A United 
Europe:  The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity, eds.  Gastelaars, M., and A. de Ruijter.  Maastricht, Germany: 
Shaker Publishing.  p. 18. 
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that it is taken for granted.20  This does not mean European identity must become dominant 
over national identities to be meaningful, however.   
European identity may exist even in the presence of competing identities.  An 
individual or group may maintain multiple collective identities, even if they are in conflict.21  
Collective identities may be “nested” among competing identities.  “Nested” implies co-
existence, but does not imply co-equivalence.  When some authors speak of collective 
European identity, they speak of a Europe whose citizens view themselves as Europeans first, 
and members of their nation second, if at all.  However, “European” does not need to become 
a primary identity in order to be taken for granted as an identity.  Existing evidence supports 
this notion.  
 Although national affiliation remains a primary identity for most Europeans, large 
segments of the population self-identify as at least partially “European.”  Eurobarometer, a 
pollster organization funded by the European Commission, conducts public opinion surveys 
among the citizens of EU member states semi-annually.  Often, the organization publishes 
data on how closely EU members identify with Europe compared to their home nationalities.  
While its methods of measurement from year to year are typically altered, consistently 
around half of the EU members polled identify with both their home country and with 
Europe.  2004 data revealed that across the 15 EU members of the time, 47% said they 
identified with their respective ‘nationality and European,’ 7% identified as ‘European and 
[their respective] nationality,’ and only 3% identified themselves as ‘European only.’22  
Identification between national and European identities remained remarkably uniform across 
                                                 
20
 Finnemore and Sikkink.  1998.  p. 904. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Eurobarometer.  2004.  p. 94.   
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the span of Eurobarometer readings, meaning the sense of European identity has not grown 
despite the persistent presence of transnational institutions.23   
FIGURE 1 
 
Source: Eurobarometer.  2004.  p. 94. 
A demographic breakdown of where the numbers are coming from struggles to find 
answers (Figure 2).  As Neil Fligstein corroborates in his own analysis of the same data, one 
of the strongest predictors of identification with Europe is age.24  One might assume that 
these young people would carry their favor for European identity into the next age bracket.  
However, he found in a comparison between 1992 and 2004 data that there was only a slight 
cumulative effect as the younger European-identifiers became older.  While there was a 
statistically significant increase in the oldest age category between the two time frames, the 
increase was small in proportion to the number of aged people who had earlier been Europe-
identifiers.25  There are several possible reasons for this, such as a change in political 
                                                 
23
 Fligstein.  2008.  p. 125. 
24
 Ibid, p. 141. 
25
 Ibid. 
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affiliation as they aged, a bad streak in the regional or local economies, poor leadership in the 
EU, and so on.  The data cannot support any of these hypotheses, however.  
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Source: Eurobarometer.  2004.  p. 92. 
Education level was also a very important factor in determining whether or not the 
respondent identified with Europe.26  Generally speaking, the best-educated Europeans (20+ 
                                                 
26
 Eurobarometer.  2004.  p. 92. 
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years) identified themselves as European more frequently than less-educated Europeans (15-
). 
A geographic breakdown of European identification shows that some countries are 
more strongly European.  In later analysis, the extent European identity pervades each 
country reliably reflects how vigorously each country has pursued a European identity via 
space activities.  The British, for example, are one of the most strongly national countries in 
Europe; consequently, history has shown them to have most frequently questioned the need 
for European independence in space.  In contrast, the French have been among the most 
dogged supporters of a European space program, and the relative strength of their primary 
and secondary European identification mirrors this.  Up to this point, the desire of European 
space policy’s norm entrepreneurs and institutional leaders to promote the idea of “Europe” 
has been taken as given.  Historical evidence is necessary to prove this has been the intention 
from the inception of ESRO and ELDO to the present day.  
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FIGURE 3 
 
Source: Eurobarometer.  2004.  p. 9627 
 The intent to construct a collective European identity appeared frequently among the 
norm entrepreneurs and leaders of Europe’s space program.  Of the European powers, the 
French probably deserve the most credit for contributing towards a collective European 
                                                 
27
 Abbreviations:  AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FR = France, FI = Finland, DE = Germany, 
EL = Greece, UK = Great Britain, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = The Netherlands, PT = 
Portugal, ES = Spain, SE = Sweden, CY = Cyprus (South), CZ = Czech Republic, EE = Estonia, HU = 
Hungary, LV = Latvia, LT = Lithuania, MT = Malta, PL = Poland, SK = Slovakia, SI = Slovenia, BG = 
Bulgaria, RO = Romania, TR = Turkey, HR = Croatia, CY(n) = Cyprus (North). 
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identity.   It was General de Gaulle who, against the counsel of his advisors, opted to pursue 
cooperation28 on the construction of a European launcher.29  Early on, France stood up for the 
interests of smaller countries by sacrificing potential national gains from ESRO and ELDO in 
order to confer enough benefits to the small countries to keep them involved.  On the issue of 
restricting ESRO activities, in 1960, a French delegate argued it would have been contrary to 
the spirit of the space research organization to focus on national program use of ESRO 
facilities; it would have privileged the large states, while conferring few benefits to the 
smaller members.30 
 Though the British were frequently criticized as a roadblock towards greater 
European integration, as the early European space technology leader,31 the English had less 
to gain from participating with Europe than other countries.  Europe benefited from a large 
pool of sophisticated technology at the United Kingdom’s expense.  Without the British 
rocket Blue Streak, ELDO might not have been possible, or at least would have been set back 
by years.  Indeed, “it is surprising that the UK did not try to make more of the point that they 
were making Europe a free gift of ₤60M worth of development costs.”32 
 As the European Space Agency came into force, its first director, Roy Gibson, opened 
an address to an assembly of ESA Ministers: “‘Allow a new boy a first indiscretion … One 
understands the interest which a Member State has in seeing one of its nationals appointed to 
a senior post in the Agency,’ but it was ‘cardinal to the health of the Agency that all 
                                                 
28
 Though we should temper this with the knowledge he chose to block the UK’s entrance into the EEC on 
multiple occasions.  See below citation. 
29
 Kirge, J., and A. Russo.  2000.  “A History of the European Space Agency:  1958-1987.”  Vol. 1.  ESA 
Publications.  Noordwijk, Netherlands: ESA Publications Division.  pp. 100-1. 
30
 Ibid, p. 47. 
31
 Ibid, p. 9. 
32
 Hill, C.N.  2001.  A Vertical Empire:  The History of the UK Rocket and Space Programme, 1950-1971.  
London, England: Imperial College Press.  pp. 136-7. 
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concerned should be very, very clear that, once a person enters the Agency, he ceases to 
serve national interests’ and act not as ‘national ambassadors.’”33  34  Among the leadership 
of Europe’s space institutions, the idea of a collective European identity gained ground.  
During the 1990s, for example, the French continued to support Columbus, the ESA 
contribution to the International Space Station (ISS), despite their outward position they no 
longer held interest in the project, merely for the sake of being “good Europeans.”35   
The belief in space policy’s ability to ascribe meaning to ‘Europe’ carries on in present day 
ESA Director General, Jean-Jacques Dordain, who believes that “[s]pace can contribute to 
European cohesion and identity”36 by reaching out to citizens across Europe, building a 
“society of knowledge.”37     
The relationship between European space activities and European identity is 
“mutually constitutive,” which is to say that each influences the other simultaneously, 
forming a feedback loop.  Not only do the leaders of European space activities seek to 
construct a European identity, they have responded to the pressures of the environment 
around them and to the ideas that permeated Europe from the 1960s forward.  ESRO was 
conceived by scientists, and supported by a Europe with the painful memory of World War II 
fresh in its mind.  They believed firmly that the military had no place in a space science 
                                                 
33
 Krige, J., Russo, A., and L. Sebesta.  2000.  “A History of the European Space Agency:  1958-1987.”  Vol. 2.  
ESA Publications.  Noordwijk, Netherlands: ESA Publications Division.  p. 34. 
34
 He would, however, go on to say in the same speech that the ESA had more in common with a large 
industrial firm than an international organization, underlining another emphasized norm of the period for 
European space activities – economic sufficiency.  This will be important in later analysis. 
35
 Beattie, Donald A.  1971.  ISScapades:  The Crippling of America’s Space Program.  Ontario, Canada: 
Collector’s Guide Publishing Inc.  p. 150. 
36
 Dordain, Jean-Jacques.  2007.  “ESA Director General’s Proposal for the European Space Policy.”  ESA 
Publications.  Noordwijk, Netherlands: ESA Publications Division.  p. 19. 
37
 Ibid 
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institution,38 a conviction that was ingrained into each of the ESRO,39 ELDO,40 and the 
ESA41  Conventions.  Today, Director Dordain has continued the ESA’s commitment to 
“exert global leadership in selected policy areas in accordance with European interests and 
values.”42   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Kirge and Russo.  2000.  p. 22. 
39
 Sheehan, Michael.  2007.  The International Politics of Space.  New York, NY: Routledge.  p. 81. 
40
 Madders, Kevin.  1997.  A New Force at a New Frontier.  New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  p. 
44. 
41
 ESA.  2005.  “CONVENTION for the establishment of a European Space Agency.”  6th ed.  ESA 
Publications.  Noordwijk, Netherlands: ESA Publications Division.  p. 13. 
42
 Dordain.  2007.  p. 21. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Constitutive elements of the norm life cycle 
A constructivist approach to analyzing the historical narrative of European space 
policy and its influence on collective identity focuses on the life cycle of a norm as a process 
in which a multitude of variables affect how the norm emerges, spreads, becomes 
internalized (if at all), and dies.  The need for norm entrepreneurs to persuade states to adopt 
a norm, and subsequently, for the adoptive states to socialize it, is a social process which is 
not adequately explained by other disciplines in international relations (IR) theory.  The 
focus of this chapter is to explain what constructivism is so that categorizations may be made 
for the variables that affect the construction of a norm - in this case, European collective 
identity.  While constructivism provides for basic “constitutive elements,” or the variables 
that matter to norm construction, factors more specific to European collective identity may be 
identified in the literature regarding European identity in general, which are useful in 
describing the historical narrative of European space policy.  
Constructivism is an approach43 or perspective, not a theory,44 to increase 
understanding of international relations in a social context.45  It seeks to account for interests 
and behavior,46 which are determined not just by material factors, but also ideational 
influences,47 such as culture, norms and ideas.48  “From a constructivist perspective, 
                                                 
43
 Kratchowil, Friedrich V.  2001.  “Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study.”  In 
Constructing International Relations:  The Next Generation, eds.  Fierke, Karin M., and Knud E. Jorgensen.    
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp.  p. 15. 
44
 Wendt, Alexander.  1999.  Social Theory of International Politics.  New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press.  p. 193. 
45
 Prügl, Elisabeth.  1998.  “Feminist Struggle as Social Construction: Changing the Gendered Rules of Home-
Based Work.”  In International Relations in a Constructed World, eds.  Kubalkova, V., Onuf, N., and P. 
Kowert.  London, England: M.E. Sharp.  p. 128. 
46
 Ruggie, John Gerard.  1998.  Constructing the World Polity:  Essays on International Institutionalization.  
New York, NY: Routledge.  p. 4. 
47
 Wendt.  1999.  p. 138. 
48
 Ruggie.  1998.  p. 4. 
 15
international structure is determined by the international distribution of ideas.  Shared ideas, 
expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior are what give the world structure, order, 
and stability.”49  Rules and norms make up social structures, within which agents interact.50  
A discussion of each of these concepts lends to greater understanding. 
Constructivism is not a theory because it cannot predict interest or behavior; it can 
only give reasons why events took place.  Constructivists face the same problem as realists - 
explaining change.51  As it is meant to increase understanding of the social underpinnings of 
political life, the subject material which falls under the constructivist umbrella ranges from 
the family to the nation to transnational organizations.  The norm life cycle, used here to 
evaluate where among the three stages of norm development European collective identity 
lands, is not a constructivist theory.  Constructivism is useful to understand, historically, how 
a norm advances through its life cycle, but it is the model which predicts whether a norm will 
become internalized.  Constructivist analysis may even be used to provide the information 
which forms the basis of a prediction, but only when coupled with another theory or model. 
Constructivism is, at root, a social understanding of how the world came to exist as it 
is. Nicholas Onuf posits that the world is composed of social human beings.  Indeed, “Social 
relations make or construct people – ourselves – into the kind of beings that we are.  
Conversely, we make the world what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides, by 
doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other.”52  Political 
interactions are in fact human interactions, and people carry with them more than the 
                                                 
49
 Finnemore and Sikkink.  1998.  pp. 894. 
50
 Prügl.  1998.  p. 128. 
51
 Finnemore and Sikkink.  1998.  pp. 894. 
52
 Onuf, Nicholas.  1998.  “Constructivism: A User’s Manual.”  In International Relations in a Constructed 
World, eds.  Kubalkova, V., Onuf, N., and P. Kowert.  London, England: Verso.  p. 59.  Italics in original. 
 16
material needs of the state or social structure they are a part of.  They also carry norms and 
ideas, conceptions of how the world ought to be.  Constructivists argue that these beliefs are 
expressed in human interactions and make up some part of how individuals, as well as social 
structures, perceive their interests and how they act upon them.  
Constructivism differentiates itself from other IR approaches by giving agency to 
norms in the determination of interest and behavior.  An interest may be defined as a “want” 
backed up by a “reason” for that desire.53  Closely related, behavior is an action taken by an 
actor in pursuit of an interest.54  “In rationalist models, self-interested actors maximize their 
utility, subject to constraints.”55  While rationalists acknowledge the presence of ideas, norms 
and culture, they tend to assign little meaning to their influence on interests and behavior.  As 
a result, they tend to believe that interests do not change over time.56  For example, Hans 
Morgenthau conceived of the national interest purely in terms of power; he believed every 
choice that the state made was in the pursuit of comparative benefits.57  While subsequent 
revisions of realism would allow for different forms of power beyond military strength, such 
as economic, cultural or even moral power, the basic interest remained the same; securing 
comparative material benefits for the state.  Constructivists do not deny that there are 
material bases for interests, merely that ideas also form a basis in the determination of 
                                                 
53
 Ball, Terrence.  1979.  “Interest-Explanations.”  Polity, Vol. 12, No. 2.  pp. 200-1.  This is an extension of 
Hannah Pitken’s definition of an “interest” simply as a “want.”  (See Pitkin, Hannah F.  1967.  The Concept of 
Representation.  Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.  p. 160)  Ball contends that an interest cannot 
merely be a want, as wants are not always acted upon.  Behavior stems from a particular want that the actor has 
some reason for pursuing.  For example, there is a difference between saying, “I want that piece of land,” and “I 
want that piece of land because I deserve it more than its owner does.” 
54
 Ball.  1979.  p. 190. 
55
 Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane.  1993.  “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework.”  In 
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Instiutions, and Political Change, eds.  Judith Goldstein and Robert O 
Keohane.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  p. 4. 
56
 Ruggie.  1998.  p. 33.  
57
 Morgenthau, Hans, and Kenneth Thompson.  1985.  Politics Among Nations.  6th ed.  New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill.  p. 165. 
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interests,58 and that because of ideas, interests can change.59  Kathryn Sikkink provides 
historical evidence supporting this concept in her work on human rights policies in the US 
and Europe.  She found that both the US and Europe (the US more slowly than Europe) 
adopted human rights policies purely in the belief that they ought to do so.  Neither region 
stood to benefit from the policy choice materially, as the countries they directed human rights 
pressure towards were already developing economically in ways beneficial to the West.60  
For Sikkink, this indicated the transformative power of ideas on interests.  “Ideas are the lens, 
without which no understanding of interests is possible.  Ideas transform perceptions of 
interests,”61 and even the political and economic interests realists promote require an idea of 
what those interests are to begin with.62 
Norms and ideas, according to constructivists, constrain behavior.  Once norms 
become institutionalized, they can limit choices for behavior according to ethical or moral 
rationale.63  To extend Sikkink’s example, Europe limited its possible avenues to pursue 
material well-being by honoring an ethical commitment to human rights.  Similarly, when a 
norm goes out of vogue, the stigma attached to the norm can block the pursuit of interests 
determined by the antiquated belief.64  For example, as the appropriateness of dueling in 
America declined, the practice which before allowed individuals to resolve injuries to honor 
became constrained by ethical standards.  Interests and behavior are not merely constrained 
                                                 
58
 Wendt.  1999.  p. 138. 
59
 Sikkink, Kathryn.  1993.  “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
Western Europe.”  In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Instiutions, and Political Change, eds.  Goldstein, 
Judith, and Robert O Keohane.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  p. 140. 
60
 Ibid, p. 157. 
61
 Sikkink, Kathryn.  1991.  Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina.  Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.  p. 243. 
62
 Ibid, p. 244. 
63
 Goldstein and Keohane.  1993.  p. 16. 
64
 Finnemore and Sikkink.  1998.  pp. 891-2. 
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by norms, however.  There are several other constitutive elements which may affect their 
development.  
“Agents” engage in behavior within a “structure.”  Agents may be defined as “the 
active participants in a society.”65  They are typically thought of as “people who act on behalf 
of other people,”66 but they may also take the form of groups or organizations.  Presidents, 
interest groups, and Amnesty International would all be examples of agents.  All agents have 
interests.67  If Amnesty International one day came to the conclusion it had fulfilled all of its 
objectives as an institution, it would cease to be an agent, for it would no longer have a 
reason to act without the determination of new interests.  Structures are difficult to define, as 
they are what an agent sees, but not what they behave within.68  An illustration makes this 
clearer:  the Internet is a structure for behavior, but one does not connect to the Internet, per 
se.  One’s home computer connects to an internet service provider, which is an institution.  
Similarly, leaders may “see” the international system, but they behave within and between 
states or transnational institutions.  Agents see structure, but behave within institutions.  
Agents behave according to interests, but this very interaction may affect how they perceive 
their interests in the next interaction.  For example, a farmer may believe it is in his interest 
to assist his neighbor in maintaining common irrigation ditches up until the point the 
neighbor ceases to do his part in maintaining the system.  At this point, it is in the farmer’s 
interest to maintain only his own irrigation to mitigate the free-riding of his neighbor.  
Agents are also constrained by their structure.  Villagers who live in a lost kingdom see only 
their village and behave accordingly.  If they are discovered by outsiders, their behavior and 
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interests will change accordingly.  Structure is similarly sensitive to agents, interests and 
behaviors.  Changes in one may lead to changes in structure, and vice versa.  The entire 
existence of structure depends on the stable co-existence of several factors:  agents, 
institutions, and rules.69   
A rule is defined as “a statement that tells people what we should do.”70  Rules have 
two characteristics: they are both regulative and constitutive.71  Regulative rules are meant to 
have causal effects.  For example, speed limits are intended to serve a range of utilitarian 
purposes, from increasing fuel efficiency to reducing accidents.  Speed limits are not 
necessary for an individual to be able to drive his car.  Constitutive rules, on the other hand, 
“define the set of practices that make up any particular consciously organized social 
activity.”72  For example, the rules of chess are necessary to play the game at all.  According 
to Gould, constructivists believe agents and structures make each other “real” by interacting 
within the rules that permit their conduct.73  Constructivists care most about the constitutive 
rules present within a structure because these rules “make agents out of individual human 
beings by giving them opportunities to act upon the world.”74  Despite their particular 
importance to structure, rules are mutually constitutive with interests, behavior, and agents as 
well.  Rules can constrain interests, particularly where norms are involved.  For example, the 
belief system of a Buddhist monk limits his material interests.  Rules have a stronger effect 
on behavior.  Without a common system of time, the ability of individuals to coordinate their 
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activities would be severely diminished.  In concert, all of these constitutive elements – 
interests, behaviors, agents, structures, rules and norms – play a part in the social 
construction of collective identity.      
Communication among agents is a critical component in the construction of identity.  
As Paul Kowert argues, constructivists claim that “people strive not only to make sense out 
of their world and to act within it, but also to communicate their understandings to others.  At 
the same time, the process of communication is a process of making sense … speaking is 
doing is knowing.”75  This matters because speech acts may in turn be institutionalized into 
rules, which has a constitutive effect on the agents and the structure they act within - even in 
ways that benefit some actors, while disadvantaging others.76  Any effect on norms, rules, 
agents or structures consequently impacts interests and behavior, because each interaction 
influences what the agent wants (interest) and how he is going to get it (behavior).  This in 
turn affects identity, as each change in interest and behavior results in a change in how 
individuals perceive themselves and the world.  In order for collective identity to form, a 
group of people must arrive and remain within a similar world view, constructed by the 
events and pressures of the world around them.  This is only possible through social 
interaction.  Culture, then, is constructed when individuals communicate their values to one 
another and come to a “common set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in 
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[people’s] attention and behavior, as in their thoughts and feelings.’”77  In terms of the norm 
life cycle model, this convergence of norms represents the third stage of “internalization.” 
In review, there are six constitutive elements from the constructivist literature to 
search for in the historical analysis.  These categories of variables will serve to increase 
understanding of the construction of European collective identity, and its place in the norm 
life cycle.  Interests, behaviors, norms, agents, structures, and rules each affect how and why 
people interact, and in turn, those interactions cause changes in each of these constitutive 
elements, which in turn affects the next interaction in an unending process of mutual 
constitution.  With the core constitutive elements defined, understanding of European 
identity’s life cycle may be increased further by considering additional constitutive elements 
particular to the case of European space policy.  Two elements from the norm life cycle 
discussion in Chapter One, norm entrepreneurs and epistemic communities, are particularly 
germane. 
In the norm life cycle, norm entrepreneurs are a special kind of agent.  Whereas the 
normal agent constructs their interests, the entrepreneur manufactures them.  Norm 
entrepreneurs create their own interest through “empathy, altruism and ideational 
commitment.”78  For the entrepreneur, promotion of the norm produces its own utility.  Other 
agents, even those who adopt particular interests simply because they believe they ought to, 
inevitably pursue at least some material interests in order to survive.  Norm entrepreneurs eat, 
of course, but as agents of their particular norm, their behavior is consumed entirely by 
selling the idea, even if the particular norm they are trying to promote in fact encourages 
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material interests.  Norm entrepreneurs who successfully persuade states to adopt their norm 
can affect any of the constitutive elements via the critical mass of states they convince.  
Entrepreneurs seldom have the power to coerce behaviors themselves, so they persuade 
power-holding states or institutions to do it for them.79  Norm entrepreneurs may take the 
form of individuals, interest groups or institutions.  Particular institutions, offering expertise 
in a particular policy area, briefly introduced as “epistemic communities,” similarly play an 
important role in introducing a new norm. 
The history of European space policy shows that epistemic communities have played 
a discernable role in the direction of Europe’s space institutions by guiding the space 
program through each major development in its history.  Several committees have helped to 
guide European space policy, perhaps most notably, the European Space Council (ESC).  The 
ESC was a panel of experts who were assembled initially to serve as a forum for 
representatives of ELDO’s and ESRO’s member states to arbitrate problems.80  It took on a 
much larger role, however, in transforming the initial European space programs into the 
single European Space Agency, which exists today.81  Since then, the ESA has itself become 
an epistemic community, consulting for the European Union on issues involving space, 
where requested, in an advisory capacity.82  Epistemic communities often act in a similar 
manner to norm entrepreneurs.  The advice dispensed by these groups carries ideas about 
what their benefactor’s interests ought to be to achieve a particular goal.  In the case of 
European space institutions, the ESC and similar epistemic bodies progressed European 
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identity by pushing ELDO and ESRO to make structural and rule changes beneficial to that 
end.  Outside constructivism and the norm life cycle model, the literature which explores the 
construction of a European collective identity offers a handful of constitutive elements 
germane to the history of European space policy.  Two are particularly helpful to the 
narrative of European space history:  invented histories and the construction of an “other.”   
 Identity begins with history, whether that history is real or imagined.  It is “central to 
the imagining of community, for how people experience the past is intrinsic to their 
perception of the present.”83  The problem with Europe is that it is difficult to find such a 
common history.  Much of the last 150 years in Europe was defined by nationalism, and 
many Europeans fought very hard to protect and distinguish their national sense of self.84  In 
order to build a common European culture, norm entrepreneurs and regional leaders are 
going to have “ ‘to get Europe’s history wrong’ … To falsely invent history as a construction 
of intellectuals is the basis of a shared collective identity.”85  Only through this process of 
invention and reinvention may a “continuity with the past”86 result in a common history.  
Alternatively, identities may be formed through a process of “experiences and their 
interpretation.”87  Experiences, alone, hold no normative value; they are simply occurrences 
or events, and mean nothing.  However, when experiences are ascribed meaning through 
interpretation, the experience becomes worth something to either an individual or a group of 
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people, who then change their perception of the world and how they interact with others.  
Interpreted experiences always involve norms.  People believe the experience meant 
something, whatever that may be.  With regards to European space policy, there are entire 
books filled with technical histories of every single space project ever conceived and 
pursued.  The key to building a common history through European space institutions is for 
someone to interpret those occurrences as meaningful.  Beyond invented histories, the 
European collective identity literature provides one other constitutive element included in the 
subsequent historical analysis: the creation of an “other.”  
International interaction between Europe and foreign powers legitimizes the concept 
of “Europe” by constructing an out-group.  Constructivists “argue and have shown that even 
identities are generated in part by international interaction – both the generic identities of 
states qua state, as well as their specific identities, as in America’s sense of difference from 
the old world or from godless communism.”88  Interactions between the United States and 
Europe have partially fulfilled the construction of an American out-group with respect to 
Europe, though not perfectly.  The business of comparing itself to America has been 
awkward for Europe.  On the one hand, Europe “regarded American society as inferior 
morally and culturally…”89 and sought to distinguish itself from the US in this capacity.  
Still, for a long while, Europeans wanted very much to replicate the economic and 
technological success of “American modernity.”90  In this respect it became closer to the 
United States.  Europe’s indecision whether to push or pull the US from the European circle, 
in terms of space policy history, has been a function of American interests and behaviors 
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with respect to its Atlantic partners.  The American impact on the construction of a European 
in-group is interesting, and will garner its own section in Chapter Seven. 
 Let us review the identified constitutive elements that we seek in a history of 
European space policy.  From the constructivist literature, there are six basic components of 
social construction: interests, behaviors, agents, structures, rules and norms.  In addition to 
the basic elements, a discussion of the life cycle model and the general European experience 
has suggested additional elements to look for while examining the European space policy 
historical narrative.  The constitutive effects found in these tow areas include, but are not 
limited to: norm entrepreneurs, epistemic communities, the basis for a common history and 
the development of “other.” 
  FIGURE 4 
Constitutive elements … 
…found in the constructivist literature. …found in the general European experience. 
Interests Norm entrepreneurs 
Behaviors Epistemic communities 
Agents The basis for a common history 
Structures The development of "other" 
Rules   
Norms   
 
Each of these ten constitutive elements increases understanding of European space policy’s 
progress of European collective identity in the norm life cycle.  They shall be identified and 
discussed in each subsequent chapter.  Constructivist analysis begins with the narrative of the 
European space program’s birth. 
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CHAPTER THREE: European space policy and norm emergence 
 In European space policy history, the norm that European states ought to behave as 
Europeans underwent the first stage of the norm life cycle from 1957 to 1975.  Although 
both ELDO and ESRO each experienced tipping points into the second stage early on, the 
appropriateness of European behavior among European space institutions lost out to other 
norms during the 1960s as a consequence of the pressures and events of the time.  Applying 
the lessons of ESRO and ELDO, however, the European Space Council (ESC), with the help 
of France, began another cycle of norm emergence which succeeded in advancing the norm 
into its second stage permanently (to date). 
 This section presents a historical narrative of European space policy history, 
interrupted by constructivist analysis to signpost progress along the norm life cycle.  The 
constitutive elements identified in Chapter Two are applied here, as well as in Chapter Four, 
to help understand why the appropriateness of European cooperation developed the way it 
did.     
 
The birth of ESRO 
 The space era began with the launch of Sputnik.  On October 5, 1957, the Soviets 
announced the successful launch of Sputnik I.91  It was a simple device whose only functions 
were to carry out basic atmospheric tests, and most importantly, to transmit a repeating signal 
down to the surface92 that people could listen to on their radios.  For such humble functions, 
this small satellite caused a massive uproar.  The American public perceived this as a 
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confirmation of Soviet ability to deliver nuclear warheads to the North American continent 
and became swept up in panic.93  Behind closed doors, President Eisenhower knew the 
Americans were outpacing the Soviets in the technology necessary to deliver nuclear 
weapons.  However, he underestimated just how severely Sputnik would affect the national 
psyche.94  President Kennedy recognized and tapped into the immense importance the public 
placed on space technology, declaring during his election campaign, “we cannot run second 
in this race.  To [ensure] peace and freedom, we must be first.”95  On May 25, 1961, 
President Kennedy stepped before Congress and challenged the country to a race to the 
moon, consuming NASA for ten years.96 
 The reaction in Europe was not quite as intense as in America, but the Sputnik launch 
made “scientists in both France and Britain [begin] to appreciate the technological gulf that 
separated them from their Soviet counterparts.”97  In comparison to European capacity, the 
Americans and Soviets were committing unconscionable levels of resources to their space 
race, and the Europeans really had no way of directly competing.98  As such, it was assumed 
early on that the likely course of space technology in Europe, if any, would be a multi-
national effort.  The British, French and Italian national space programs, which got their start 
in the mid-1950s carried on while they considered their options, and were courted by both the 
Americans and Soviets for cooperation on satellite projects.99  This is not to say there was an 
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absence of urgency in Europe.  Several countries convened committees on the issue of space 
research, and the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN) considered a request in 
1957 to create a European center for rocket research.100  NATO had proposed a “European 
NASA,” but the military connotations that came with the Atlantic security organization made 
this unattractive to Europeans.101  Additionally, the European Economic Community 
entertained a separate recommendation from the Council of Ministers on “the concept of a 
space agency for Europe.”102  But instead of the halls of Parliament or meetings among state 
representatives, the European Space Research Organization got its start in the home of a 
French professor.103  
ESRO was conceived by academics, not national policy-makers, and its origins “can 
be attributed to two leading scientists: Edoardo Amaldi in Italy and Pierre Auger in France.  
Both men had been involved in the formation in 1954 of the European Center for Nuclear 
Research (CERN) … After the launch of Sputnik-1 by the Soviets and the start of the 
American space program, it became apparent that space science was another field where the 
efforts of individual European nationals were inadequate.”104  Impressed by the scientific 
yield of American and Soviet and emboldened by the success of CERN, Amaldi and Auger 
met in the Luxembourg gardens of Paris in April, 1959.  There, they discussed the possibility 
of a CERN-like entity devoted to research in the spatial sciences.105  Cooperation in space 
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science would be a peaceful means of competing with the Americans and Soviets, and could 
improve Europe’s ‘moral authority.’106  
Amaldi and his supporters insisted the military not be involved in any international 
space science organization.  The Italian scientist felt keenly that the military should be left 
out of such an international research organization, and that it should pursue ideational, rather 
than purely material goals.  “The conquest of space had to be a peaceful enterprise on behalf 
of the whole of mankind, he claimed, and the presence of the military would prevent a space 
organization from pursuing this ‘moral’ goal.”107  If the military were allowed to be involved, 
he believed each country would try to build its own rockets.108  Amaldi’s strong anti-military 
sentiment stemmed from limitations the military had placed on his own research in the past.  
Further, he believed only a peaceful organization would gain the support of neutral countries, 
such as Sweden and Switzerland.109  
Scientists tried very hard to maintain control of any new space science organization.  
They pushed to put themselves, in place of bureaucrats tied to home governments, on the 
budgetary and policy making councils.  Although they wanted government money, they also 
wanted to prevent governments from meddling with their projects.110  Government 
involvement was inevitable, however, for running parallel to the formation of a scientific 
space organization were state-level negotiations dealing with the question of a European 
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launch vehicle.111  The obvious link between space science and rockets kept governments 
apprised and involved in the scientific end of space activities.  
Four years after the initial protocol was signed in 1959 to begin laying out the 
framework of ESRO, the resulting Convention came into effect in March 1963.  “Under the 
terms of its convention, ESRO was to promote collaboration among European states, 
exclusively for peaceful purposes.  The initial member states were Belgium, Denmark, 
France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  Austria, 
Norway and Ireland were given observer status.”112  The development of a European 
launcher would proceed much differently. 
The interactions between the US and the Soviet Union resulting from Sputnik created 
a new structure for interaction among states.  Both Kennedy and the Soviet propaganda 
machine recognized and exploited the public perception of space technology as a symbol for 
power.  The Americans and Soviets engaged in the new structure through their space 
institutions, NASA and the Soviet military, respectively.  The structure was open also to 
European states, but their ability to respond was severely constrained by the underdeveloped 
state of their national space institutions.  The contrast in technological capacity between the 
superpowers and European states was galvanizing.  Europe - not just individual European 
states - was seriously behind on the technology curve, lending to the European 
conceptualization of “other.”  The resulting conversation was not “what will the Frenchmen 
do?” or “what will the British do?” but “what will Europeans do?” 
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Enter Amaldi and Auger.  As norm entrepreneurs, they open the first stage of the 
norm life cycle, attempting to persuade Europeans states to respond as Europeans through a 
peaceful, scientific organization.  As a result of their experiences in CERN, their dislike for 
the military, the scientific productivity of American and Soviet space institutions, the 
pressures exerted by the Russo-American space race, and the resulting felt need among 
European states to close the technological gap, they constructed their proposed solution to the 
American and Soviet challenge: a common European space science institution.   
To be sure, there were several strictly material motivations behind this solution.  
Functionally, European states could not afford to match the expenditures of the superpowers 
as individual states.  The economic rationale for cooperation among European states could be 
predicted by rationalist explanations of behavior.  To a realist’s line of thinking, the intent 
behind cooperation on the scale of Europe, while extraordinary, would be pursued in the 
interest of power in comparison to the superpowers.  Further, the conditions constructed by 
Sputnik gave European space scientists an excellent opportunity for increased government-
financed research.  These rationales are undeniably present in Amaldi’s and Auger’s 
courtship of national policy-makers, but they also sought something more.   
Amaldi and Auger were norm entrepreneurs for their promotion of an extra-rational 
sense that proceeding as Europe was useful beyond a narrow, competitive utility.  For them, 
the construction of a European collective identity had value beyond the ability to provide 
competitive benefits with respect to space capability.  Amaldi believed European states 
should worry first about building an international organization with both a “European” and 
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“scientific character.”113  Once those were established, material benefits, such as increased 
security, would fall into place easily.114  
The effect of the ESRO Convention was to provide a structure for European 
interaction and a set of constitutive rules which enabled those interactions.  Science had 
always possessed an international character, but under ESRO it was specifically European.  
As a standalone organization, its potential to integrate Europe was limited, but it added a 
layer to the history of European experiences.  Its convocation was an important step in the 
process of constructing a collective identity, for the negotiation of rules was a process of 
bargaining state interests which would otherwise interfere with the European character of the 
institution. 
The institutionalization of ESRO, with respect to European space science up until 
1963, would be considered a tipping point for proceeding to the second stage of the norm life 
cycle.  Although events would unfold in way to cause this foray into the second stage to 
become abortive, for a short while, the future of European space science was bright. 
 
The birth of ELDO 
The diverging motivations behind ELDO and ESRO pushed the two programs down 
separate paths.  Whereas the scientists wanted a space program to conduct atmospheric and 
space experiments, the politicians wanted a space program to fulfill political, military and 
commercial interests.  The instinct was to keep the two separate.115  The French gave explicit 
reasons for divorcing these two programs.  For one, they felt the high costs of developing a 
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launcher would marginalize the availability of funds for science projects.  Furthermore, 
combining the two programs would make membership very costly for smaller countries, and 
would exclude the neutral countries who wanted no part in technology that could change the 
balance of power.116   
The birth of ELDO stemmed from a convergence of interests between the power 
centers of Europe.  At the time of Sputnik’s launch, Britain was the leader of Europe in 
rocket technology owing to captured German rockets in World War II.117  Even so, the 
premier UK national missile project, Blue Streak, was not meeting the strategic expectations 
of the British military.  Powered by cryogenic fuels, Blue Streak was limited to first-strike 
capability.  By 1960, the military had lost confidence in Blue Streak as a weapon, and 
cancelled the project.118  
But the British were loathe to let the millions already spent on Blue Streak go to 
waste, believing it would be damaging to the national psyche.119  The government began 
searching for ways to keep the project alive while reducing costs.  “The idea that Blue Streak 
could be more appropriately used in a civilian space programme was first floated by Geoffrey 
Pardoe, head of the Blue Streak project with De Havilland, during an industrial symposium 
in late 1959 and was pursued in contacts with French officials during 1960.”120 At the time, 
the French were completing construction of their Veronique missile, which was powerful 
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enough to launch small satellites.  France was not in the position, however, to develop a 
heavy launcher, and desired British technical knowledge on the subject.121  
In terms of heavy launcher technology, the French needed the British more than the 
other way around.  However, the British were also interested in entering the European 
Economic Community122 and saw this as an opportunity both to defray the costs of Blue 
Streak and prove that the UK could be a valuable member of Europe.  In September, 1960, 
the British formally offered Blue Streak to be used as the first stage rocket of a joint launcher 
project with the French.  By January, 1961, Harold MacMillan and General de Gaulle had 
agreed that the British would provide the first stage, the French, the second, and a third stage 
from another joint participant.123  “To encourage Germany’s participation in the Anglo-
French project they were promised the third stage of the launcher.  That left Italy.  And the 
Italians, like the Germans before them, were most unenthusiastic about the scheme.”124  
Speaking for the Italians, Edoardo Amaldi argued the French and English would bias 
industrial contracts to themselves, the task of organizing such a large project would be 
difficult between countries, and the costs of independent development would be unjustifiable 
when the same technology could be purchased from other countries.125  The conflict was 
settled by offering the Italians the duty of building the satellites to be sent up by the 
completed launcher. 
On March 29, 1962, “a convention setting up the European Launcher Development 
Organization (ELDO) was formally signed in London by its seven member states – France, 
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Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Australia.”126  The involvement 
of the Australians owed mainly to the need for the Anglo-Australian launch site in Woomera, 
ideal for its proximity to the equator.127  128  The Belgians and Dutch, on the other hand, 
sought involvement more purely to become part of a European effort, gain experience in 
space technology, and perhaps garner some national prestige in the process.  The convention 
was ratified in February, 1964.129 
 Like ESRO, ELDO was born in part for a felt need to create an institution that did 
more than simply compete with the superpowers in space.  ELDO was not, however, the 
brainchild of the same individuals who brought the space research organization into being.  
The norm entrepreneurs of a European approach to building a launcher were Britain and 
France.  They were unlikely norm entrepreneurs, according to the standards of the norm life 
cycle theory, for they wielded the power of coercion as well as persuasion.130  However, for 
each their own reasons, the UK and France persuade their neighbors it was in their interest to 
behave as Europeans in the development of a space launcher.     
 Despite the powerful presence of state level interests in the formation of ELDO, 
Britain and France make extra-rational policy decisions favoring the development of Europe.  
As the two leading technological and economic powers of the region, Britain and France 
could likely have produced a launcher bilaterally if all they were interested in was to ensure 
an autonomous launcher capability.131  However, both countries consciously sacrificed 
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efficiency, comparative gains, and freely permitted the transfer of costly technology in order 
to form a European organization.  The addition of German, Italian, Belgian, Dutch and 
Australian resources was welcome to France and the UK, but economically speaking, the 
smaller states were getting the best deal. 
 A tipping point in the norm cycle occurred when West Germany and Italy were 
persuaded to join ELDO.  At that time, plans for a European launcher became viable, and the 
remaining signatory countries found joining in their interest to behave as Europeans even 
without the enticements that were necessary for Germany and Italy.  The benefits ELDO 
imbued to the idea of “Europe” were similar to those conferred by ESRO.  The structure and 
rules institutionalized by the ELDO Convention added another layer to the history of 
European endeavors.    
Here, the application of the norm life cycle model becomes problematic.  While the 
promoted norm between the two sets of norm entrepreneurs belonging to ESRO and ELDO, 
respectively, is the same (the appropriateness of a European approach to meeting challenges 
in space), there are two tipping points that occur at separate points in time.  While 
unaccounted for by the norm life cycle model, the multiple tipping points among different 
tracks of European space cooperation fits with the constructivist understanding of the process 
of norm or identity formation.  Constructivism concerns itself with the origins of social 
facts,132 and contemporary European space policy originates from a complicated history of 
antecedent policies.  A process as complex as coordinating the space activities of more than a 
dozen self-interested states should be expected to have multiple starts and stops leading to a 
single European space entity. 
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Unfortunately for ELDO, like ESRO, progress into the second stage would be short 
lived as subsequent events caused its members to question the appropriateness of a European 
approach to space. 
ESRO’s successes 
Between ELDO and ESRO, the latter enjoyed many more tangible successes, and the 
innovations it made to its industrial policy survive to this day.  After the ESRO Convention 
had been fully ratified, it came into operation in March, 1964.133  “ESRO was intended from 
the start to function independently of ELDO, designing sounding rocket experiments and 
satellite projects by taking no part in the development of launch vehicles.  As a result, when 
the Europa rocket started to run into serious problems in the mid-1960s, ESRO was able to 
continue its programmes through launches offered by [NASA].”134  As a disadvantage that 
would turn out to be a mixed blessing, ESRO did not enjoy ELDO’s ability to separate its 
projects into subsections – the satellites it planned to construct had to be built in whole.135  It 
did not take long for the issue of which countries got what contracts became a barrier to 
cooperation. 
In the interest of fairness to member states, “[t]he principle of juste retour was 
adopted.  This was the principle that contracts and responsibilities should be shared between 
the member states according to the financial contributions made to ESRO.  Although the 
principle of juste retour seemed to contain the seeds for further division, in reality, it rarely 
proved a problem within ESRO.”136  ESRO’s founders also made the conscious decision to 
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spread the new organization’s facilities evenly across its member states.  While this would 
sacrifice some level of efficiency, politically, the decision was valuable, and as the Belgians 
pointed out, NASA’s dispersal of its facilities across the US did not seem to significantly 
slow its efforts.137  
The biggest hurdle faced by ESRO was its own ambition.  Although many of its 
smaller, atmospheric experiments were unqualified successes, the first big-ticket projects of 
ESRO highlighted its inexperience.  Plans for two large satellites - the Large Astronomical 
Satellite (LAS) and a second, proposed satellite that would either perform a comet fly-by or 
pass by Jupiter – were grossly underestimated in both complexity and cost.  Yearly budgets 
were significantly strained, which did not go over well with member states who perceived the 
projects as high-cost and low-value.138  Overall, ESRO’s flight record was far superior to 
ELDO’s.  “Seven ESRO satellites were put in orbit between 1968 and 1972 and these 
performed well, returning useful scientific data.”139  Although it ran into trouble in the early 
1970s owing to issues regarding the coherency of the European space program, it was never 
officially scrapped until ESA came into force in 1975. 
 The constitutive rules institutionalized through the adoption of juste retour were 
critical to ensuring the long-term viability of ESRO.  Although the industrial arrangement 
catered directly to national economic interests, it enabled the member states to proceed as 
Europe.  Although norms and their influence on interests and behavior are important to 
constructivism, the approach is careful to qualify that states adopt both material and 
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ideational bases as they form their interests,140 as is consistent with juste retour.  ESRO 
member states addressed both national and European interests by institutionalizing the 
industrial policy.  The effect was to strengthen the structure created by the ESRO 
Convention, and to embolden the organization to pursue large projects under the belief of its 
own capability to proceed as Europe. 
 Although LAS and the second, never-formalized project reminded ESRO of the limits 
of its capabilities, the string of successes with sounding rockets and small satellites added 
another layer to the history of European accomplishments.  These are the kind of experiences 
which could be interpreted as meaningful to the cause of Europe, and lend credence to the 
idea among European states that it was in their interest to proceed as Europe. 
 With respect to European space science, ESRO enjoyed a temporary, bounded 
continuation into the second stage of the norm life cycle.  Its members were convinced of the 
appropriateness of a European approach to space science, and managed to socialize some of 
its principles such as juste retour, which survived into the ESA years.141 
 
ELDO falters 
Returning to ELDO, the French, British, West Germans, Italians, Belgians, Dutch and 
Australians had ratified the ELDO Convention in February, 1964.  Whereas ESRO had 
enjoyed a great deal of success building a program that created a truly European structure for 
each of its members to interact in, the manner of ELDO’s construction did not share its 
counterpart’s integrative spirit. 
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The ELDO Convention was constructed in a way that privileged state interests over 
the well being of the organization.  The 33-point program of powers and voting rights present 
in the Convention were written to keep the institution weak.142  The Secretary General of 
ELDO, by Convention, was granted “only the vague power of coordinating activities which, 
for the most part, were conducted by already existing and powerful national organizations, in 
particular in France and in the United Kingdom.”143  To be fair, the ELDO Convention was 
not totally devoid of pan-European sentiment.  The language of the preamble was written to 
emphasize the “collective nature of the new European technological community,”144 and 
expressly forbade the use of Europa145 for military applications (though truly, there were 
few146).  
Early on, ELDO was beset by technical, budgetary and political problems. 
Inexperience with launcher technology caused initial cost projections to be seriously below 
the true cost of developing Europa.147  Whereas projections at the time of signing the ELDO 
Convention had been placed at £70m, by 1964, updated estimates had skyrocketed to 
£404m.148  For member states that joined in part to benefit from cost-savings, this was 
frustrating.  While the individual stages of Europa were relatively successful on their own (in 
fact, Blue Streak never once failed), when combined as a completed rocket, neither Europa I 
nor the subsequent Europa II ever completed a successful flight.149  While the American and 
Soviet programs’ own high rate of rocket failure suggested this was to be expected, the 100% 
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failure rate only further damaged some members’ (particularly Britain’s) already strained 
view of Europa’s utility.150 
By 1964, “the British Conservative government which had promoted ELDO was no 
more; the Labour Party had won the British general election.”151  The possible availability of 
American launchers led the administration to question the high costs of development.152  The 
gap in technology was also present in the minds of the French.  But instead of considering 
becoming a customer of the US, they only hardened their resolve to catch up.  In 1965, the 
French announced they wanted to immediately halt construction of Europa I in favor of a 
more powerful Europa II design.  To accentuate their insistence, they withdrew their funding 
until a decision could be made.  The other members were not keen on the idea.  They felt 
more experience was necessary with Europa I prior to planning the next generation, and 
believed production time would extend unreasonably into the 1970s.153  
Up until 1967, the British rationale for participating in ELDO was to play the part of 
“good European,” and to use its technological supremacy to cement its place in a more 
integrated European community.154  It was clear from the start that the UK was not benefiting 
technologically from the ELDO partnership.  In fact, their own national capabilities could 
have permitted the British to develop a comparable heavy launcher independently by 
combining Blue Streak with another, newer British rocket, Black Knight,155 though, 
admittedly, at a premium cost.  “A seven-year policy of inducement and patience, had, 
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evidently, left the French President unmoved,”156 for after a fresh UK application to join the 
EEC in May, 1973, it was vetoed in November of the same year by the de Gaulle 
government.157  The UK had mistaken France’s eagerness to cooperate on technological 
projects as a signal de Gaulle was opening to economic cooperation with the British as well.  
In truth, de Gaulle had maintained the distinction out of fear that British economic 
cooperation would be a pathway for American interference.158 
Regardless of errors in perception, the French decision crippled British support for 
ELDO.  As early as 1965, the UK Wilson government had been set against continued 
participation in ELDO.  Two papers on British space policy of the time, the Bondi Report 
and the Space Policy Review, both concluded continued British participation in ELDO was 
inadvisable.  The reports predicted progressive cost increases, a theory supported by French 
discussion of the need for a yet more powerful launcher, Europa III, to meet communications 
satellite demands.159  The Wilson government had only held off from publicly announcing 
the desire to withdraw until such a time when it would be less politically damaging to do so.  
The French rejection in 1967 served this purpose. 
The Bad Godesberg meeting in 1968 marked the beginning of the end for ELDO. 
Gloom pervaded the conference.  Said Belgian Minister Theo Leférve, “I have the gravest 
fears for the immediate future of the space institutions and programmes we have supported 
and conducted until now at such great expense.”160  Several months ahead of the November 
meeting, the British had, in April, announced they “would continue to make Blue Streak 
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available until 1976, but without a financial contribution.”161  The British felt it unwise to 
directly compete with the Americans, who were offering the same services Europa had yet to 
fulfill at a lower per-use cost, absent development expenses.162 
Predictably, the other ELDO members were not so willing to release the British from 
their obligations, and in response, the British claimed rights under Article IV of the ELDO 
Convention, declaring themselves “not interested” in Europa II development, subsequently 
blocking approval of the 1969 ELDO budget.163  Compounding ELDO’s headache, Italy too 
declared itself not interested,164 having negotiated a much more nationally-beneficial deal 
with the Americans (resulting in the highly successful Sirio program, launched in 1977).165  
Ultimately, France, West Germany and the other ELDO members gave in to UK demands, 
reducing the expected British financial contribution from 27% to 5.245%, payable in a one-
time deposit in 1970, and released Italy and Australia from any further obligations on the 
launcher.166  Politically, Bad Godesburg was a success, for it prevented a complete 
breakdown of European cooperation in space.167  Still, the loss of British and Italian finance 
for Europa II was a serious blow.  The attractiveness of American launcher services cast 
further doubt on the utility of the organization. 
By 1973, the Germans, who long supported European launcher independence, began 
to question their convictions.  The high costs of launcher development coupled with the 
repeated failures of the Europa rockets made the economics of cooperating with the 
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Americans sensible.168  West Germany became much more interested in pursuing the 
Spacelab project, and was willing to let Europa fall by the wayside.169  The council convened 
two more times.  In the later meeting, the French proposed a simplified version of Europa III.  
It was rejected.170   
The Europa II project was officially cancelled in May, 1973, and its assets were 
transferred to ESRO.171  “The 72nd and last meeting of the ELDO Council was held on 30 
May 1975 with E.A. Plate (NL) in the chair.  He drew a balance sheet of the history of the 
organization, he thanked all who had done so much for ELDO, and he paid tribute to the 
dedication the French had shown for space affairs … Soon afterwards Plate added, 
‘Gentlemen, this is the end of my speech.  This is the end, I believe, of the meeting of the 
ELDO Council.”172  ELDO was dead. 
 As ELDO proceeded into the second stage of its norm life cycle, socialization, 
historical events unfolded in a way that suggested to member states that perhaps proceeding 
as Europe was not the best approach to developing a launcher after all.  There were state as 
well as European interests pursued by ratifying the ELDO Convention, but as time went on, 
the sacrifices required at the national level for the sake of the European program began to rise 
to intolerable levels, particularly for the British. 
 The UK joined ELDO not just for sake of cost- and face-savings regarding Blue 
Streak, but also as an overture to join “Europe” economically.173  While there was money to 
be made in so doing, the conclusion among the British was still “it is in our interest to 
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proceed as Europe.”  The UK was willing to make significant financial and technological 
transfers to persuade mainland Europe they could be “good Europeans.”  When de Gaulle 
blocked their EEC application, British interests changed. 
 Told by the French the “European” economy did not want the British, the Wilson 
government saw no reason to proceed as Europe in a technological context.174  This decision 
had a significant impact on the structure and rules of the organization.  The British initially 
chose to remove themselves completely from the structure created by the ELDO Convention, 
and in so doing, forced a number of rearrangements.  The importance of British technology 
and finances pressured the other agents (France, Belgium, etc) present in the structure to 
reform the rules constitutively to enable continued function of the structure.  Italy and 
Australia piggy-backed on the bargaining power of Britain, and got the remainder of the 
member states to alter the structure and rules to excuse them entirely.  ELDO emerged from 
the 1969 negotiations battered, but alive.  This qualified success should not be ignored.  Even 
after their rejection from the EEC, Britain decided that proceeding nationally as part of 
Europe, however cursorily, was in its interest. 
 The US space program, however, as a constitutive agent, influenced the interests of 
individual European states, resulting in changes to their structure, behavior and norms.  The 
superior, functioning technology offered by NASA was an opportunity for individual 
European states to fulfill their space ambitions without the expense of independent 
technological development.175  For Italy, a resource-constrained state, this option met their 
national interests at a lower cost and quicker return than was promised by the developing 
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European system.  The Italians decided, in the window afforded by the British threat to 
withdraw, that to proceed as Europe was not in the Italian national interest.  Similarly, the 
Germans were more attracted to the prospect of bilateral cooperation with the US on 
Spacelab than they were in continuing to pursue Europa.  While the Germans were 
supportive to the idea of “Europe,” the costs of continuing Europa did not justify continuing 
on as Europe when proceeding bilaterally with America was more beneficial. 
 As a result, the norm that European states should proceed as Europe in space 
activities was overtaken by the norm of economic sufficiency.  The norm life cycle in the 
case of ELDO collapsed, and the launcher development member states returned to national 
and bilateral structures of space launcher activity until the advent of Ariane. 
 
The American influence 
The relationship between the European and American space programs transformed 
over time from one of dependence to independence.  Reimar Lőst, a former director of the 
ESA, argued there were three periods of Euro-American partnership.  In “the first, from the 
early 1960s to the early 1970s, the US exercised ‘tutorship’ of Europe.  During the second, 
which lasted until the beginning of the mid-1980s, Europe became America’s ‘junior partner’ 
while during the third, and current, phase there has been both ‘partnership and 
competition.’”176  
After Sputnik, the United States sought European partnership both to stay ahead of 
the USSR in projects with either military or prestige value and to solidify the American-
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European alliance.177  At first, the superiority of American space technology and the 
availability of launcher services made NASA an alternative to European launcher 
independence.  In a 1959 international meeting of space scientists at the Hague, “the 
American delegate announced that his government, through NASA, would be willing to 
launch suitable experiments proposed by scientists from other countries.  The technical 
support of NASA’s experience engineers was guaranteed.”178  Indeed, in 1964, NASA went 
so far as to offer to launch the first two satellites of the newly formed ESRO for free.179 
During the ESRO and ELDO years, the absence of a European launcher forced ESRO 
to utilize American services for all of their scientific and communications satellites.  While 
this was bothersome to independence-minded Europeans like the French or Belgians, several 
European countries were only too happy to gain experience in space science through bilateral 
cooperation with NASA.  The Italians jumped at the offer from NASA to cooperate in 
scientific endeavors, and in 1962 signed an agreement forming the San Marco project, the 
first all-European satellite to orbit the Earth.180  The Spanish also benefited from American 
funds, and agreed to host tracking stations used by NASA researchers.181  Of all the 
European powers, the United Kingdom was probably the most receptive to American 
overtures up until the 1970s, as the British, more than other Europeans, tended to privilege 
economics over the intrinsic value of launcher autonomy.182 
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This all began to change, however, as Europe entered the field of communications 
satellites.  After the Intelsat Agreement signed in August, 1971, the Americans were still 
willing to provide American rockets to launch European communication satellites, but 
reserved the right to refuse services wherever European satellites might compete directly 
with American satellites.183  The conditionality of which European satellites the Americans 
were and were not willing to launch made even the British wary.  By the end of 1970, 
“feelings began to be aired in the press that the USA was ‘trying to lure Europe into 
curtailing the development of launchers and communications satellites in order that she will 
continue to be dependent on the US for these items.’”184  
Although the United States was open to cooperation, it too had interests to defend.  
The limits to what NASA was willing to do for European space efforts made it clear to 
ELDO and ESRO members that America could not be relied upon for 100% of its launcher 
needs.  Even at the onset of ESRO and ELDO, European space policy makers were cool to 
the idea of dependence on America.  In 1961, however, there was little choice unless the 
scientific program was willing to wait for a European launcher,185 or to rely on the Soviets, 
which it was not.  There were several points of friction throughout the 1960s and early 1970s 
which kept the argument for proceeding as Europe alive. 
In 1966, NASA and ESRO signed a Memorandum of Understanding186 regarding the 
future launching of ESRO scientific satellites.  Through the negotiations, one major point of 
contention arose.  NASA required that data retrieved from any European satellite launched 
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by an American rocket must be shared with NASA.  Citing intellectual property rights, 
Europe contested, arguing that normal practice dictated Europe would disperse scientific data 
it collected of its own volition.187  In 1969, NASA proved to the French and Germans that 
they could not be relied upon to provide launcher services where European commercial 
satellites would compete with American ones.  When France asked if NASA would launch 
the Franco-German Symphonie satellites, NASA, after speaking with the US Department of 
State, “replied that it would launch the two satellites only if their experimental (as opposed to 
operational) character could be demonstrated.”188  Nor was America, in 1970, willing to 
make Europe a full partner in the decisions to be made regarding post-Apollo plans for a 
Space Shuttle and Space Station.  Europe would only retain decision making power where 
purely European parts or subcontracts were concerned.  “Overall responsibility for 
management, however, ‘would necessarily rest with the US.’”189  The combination of 
launcher payload limitations, and a junior-partner status in the post-Apollo program turned 
European favor in the direction of a European capability.190 
To be fair, there were legitimate reasons for many of the barriers to cooperation the 
United States erected between itself and Europe.  NASA limitations to which 
communications satellites it would and would not launch for Europe was heavily influenced 
through lobbying from the US communication satellite industry.191  Politically, NASA felt it 
would damage itself by going against these interests.  Further, the Cold War and concerns for 
American national security were often the cause for what European space powers considered 
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to be unreasonable inflexibility.  NASA Administrator Webb felt that “NASA should ‘be in a 
position to reply to any question about its activities for ESRO’ – and, more precisely … 
satisfy concerns about the Agency’s ability ‘to be in a position to report to Congress and the 
people that it does, in principle, have full access to data acquired by any satellite launched 
from United States territory.’”192  From this angle, American insistence that European 
scientific data be made available was less a power-play than it was a concern for 
accountability. 
Even if political concerns had not manifested, it may have been impossible for NASA 
to maintain European dependence on the long term regardless.  The Space Shuttle fleet, 
which had been intended to become the “cost effective” replacement for older, expendable 
US launchers,193 came nowhere close to achieving the scales of economy its designers had 
envisioned for it.194  Compounding matters, the Challenger tragedy in January, 1986 
grounded the American fleet for years.  As a commercial launcher service, NASA would not 
have been able to meet European demand if it wanted to. 
The restrictions placed on services available, in combination with the unavailability 
of American services, pushed the Europeans on the path to launcher independence.  By the 
late 1980s, the Ariane launcher program would meet and surpass the American capability.195 
 Constitutive elements in America aided in European states’ decision to proceed as 
Europe.  NASA’s interactions with local agents including the communications satellite 
lobby, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Congress constructed the 
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American space administration’s interests in favor of constraining the constitutive rules 
which permitted cooperation with European states.  NASA genuinely wished to pursue 
cooperation with Europe,196 but the barriers to cooperation it erected in the defense of its 
perceived interests made the American alternative to a European launcher less and less 
attractive to European states.  The perceived benefits of cooperating with the Americans that 
helped to bring down ELDO were not as high as initially imagined by most European states.   
The structure considered appropriate among European states to pursue European 
space interests swung from Europe to America and back between the 1960s and early 1970s.  
Early on, the Europeans were forced to rely structurally on the Americans for lack of options, 
but they perceived this reliance as intrinsically disadvantageous, and engaged in behaviors 
favoring the idea of “Europe.”  This resulted in ELDO and ESRO, and pushed the norm life 
cycles for both institutions into the second stage.  Although ESRO performed well, the cost-
savings and supposed availability of American launchers led European states (save the 
French and Belgians) to believe that depending on the American launcher structure was 
preferable to a European approach.  This idea contributed to the disintegration of ELDO, and 
the second life cycle stage for ELDO failed.  However, when activities in the American 
structure turned out to be constrained by rules prohibitive to European interests, European 
states were pushed back to the perception that proceeding as Europe to secure launcher 
access best served their interests.197  The first stage persuasion process was begun again, and 
ultimately, the result was Ariane. 
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The Americans facilitated the construction of an “other” when the European public 
began to believe NASA was attempting to lure Europe into a cycle of dependency.  As a 
perceived antagonist to European interests, America provoked a European response, for the 
individual national programs were still incapable of responding individually.  Entering the 
1980s, the American space launcher structure no longer had the capacity to meet European 
demand.  Not wishing to become dependent upon the Soviets, European states had no other 
choice than to proceed as Europe.  
ELDO had failed, but American influence on the long-run helped to resurrect the 
norm which initially formed the basis for the doomed organization.  The limits to US 
cooperation in space led to the belief that the American launcher structure was insufficient to 
meet European interests, which triggered a change in the interests of European states, which 
led to a reorganization of the European space structure, which required new rules to regulate 
activities, which built common European experiences amenable to an invented history, and 
so on.  Each link in the chain of events helped to persuade European states to behave as 
Europeans, contributing to European collective identity. 
 
Communications satellites and the push towards ESA 
 “For the general public, the era of space communications was actually opened on 10 
July 1962, when a Thor-Delta rocket launched Telstar I, the first real-time transponder, 
designed and built for NASA by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (ATT).  
Two weeks after launch this satellite provided the first live broadcast of television images 
across the Atlantic, and less than one year later, in May 1963, Telstar II established an 
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analogous connection over the Pacific between the USA and Japan.”198  At the time, ELDO 
and ESRO were both still in the process of formation.  Europe was forced to enter the 
communications satellite field very late in the game.199  It was not until the end of 1966 that 
ESRO accepted a request from the European Conference on Satellite Communications 
(CETS) to begin a study on the feasibility of developing and launching communications 
satellite technology for Europe.200  The process of building a communications satellite policy 
would take five years owing to the political bargaining between “international relations, 
industrial policy, defense of economic and commercial interests, [and] control of areas of 
cultural influence,”201 for which there were no easy solutions. 
Communications satellites would bring to a head the question of how much farther 
Europe was willing to integrate.  The first instinct of ESRO member states was to pursue 
telecommunication satellites via national or bilateral programs.  Toward the end of the 1960s, 
the French announced they would begin design and construction of a satellite, similar to the 
CETS project then underway via ESRO.202  The Germans began work on Olympia, designed 
to transmit images of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, but later combined this with the 
French into a single program named Symphonie.203  The Italians pursued Sirio with the 
Americans.204  British doubts over the utility of the CETS project led them to pursue “an all-
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British satellite in the framework of the Anglo-American military space communications 
system Skynet.”205  
A pair of reports came out between 1966 and 1969 which would call attention to the 
need to coordinate Europe’s space projects.  The first, known as the “Causse Report,” made 
“review of European space activities [then] under way, recommending a fusion of ELDO and 
ESRO”206 into a single European space agency.  A subsequent committee, chaired by G. 
Puppi of Italy, met in 1969 and developed the concept further.207  Of the member states, this 
concept was well received by France, Belgium and Germany, who each went to 
extraordinary lengths to see it happen, particularly France.208  Whereas the other member 
states felt that ESRO should return to a limited, purely scientific organization, France, 
Belgium and Germany believed ESRO should also take on the onus of applications 
satellites.209  Following the rest of Europe would mean having to bear the cost of national 
space programs, ELDO, ESRO, and now, state-level applications satellites.  To be 
competitive with America and the Soviets, the three countries felt that Europe required a 
coherent space policy, and they let their colleagues know in a big way.   
At a 1970 European Space Conference210 meeting, France made its feelings known, 
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and “[t]o put teeth into these proposals, France then signaled her intention to withdraw from 
ESRO in 1972 if a suitable compromise embodying her key requirements could not be 
found.”211  The stiff French demands infuriated the other members.  “All agreed that reforms 
were needed, but they resented the pressure being put on them by a major participant, and 
even threatened to retaliate in kind.”212  The ESC meeting disbursed with the agreement that 
negotiations would begin to settle the dispute no later than June, 1971.213 
The disintegration of ESRO was averted (slightly behind schedule) in July, 1971.  
Exactly what programs would be pursued remained unsolved.  However, the policies of 
rapprochement to mend the rift between France and the UK led to the acceptance of the 
British into the EEC.  Heads had cooled somewhat since the embattled 1970 meeting, and the 
Council agreed to reduce the mandatory contributions to the scientific programs of ESRO to 
make way for application programs, which were made optional for member states to 
participate in.214  The French worried that “optional programs” would damage European 
coherence, but smaller countries insisted they could not afford mandatory application 
programs,215 and so the French yielded, withdrawing their threat to leave ESRO.  
The outcome of the 1971 ESC meeting in the Hague was positive, resulting in the 
“first package deal” which placed application satellites under the purview of ESRO, while 
reducing the science budget.216  The subsequent 1972 meeting was equally productive, 
resulting in the “second package deal,” which proposed a new set of programs “to overcome 
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the disputes between Britain, France and West Germany.  A new launcher (Ariane) would be 
developed by France; West Germany would lead the development of Spacelab as the 
European contribution to the post-Apollo NASA programme, and Britain would produce 
MAROTS, a maritime communications applications satellite.”217  Each country would pay 
for the bulk of their national project, and make smaller contributions to the other two.218  
With the dust settled, design of a unified European Space Agency was free to 
proceed.  The ESC intended to have a completed document presented and signed by 1974, 
but domestic politics in the member states slowed down the process, and a draft of the ESA 
Convention acceptable to all parties did not emerge until 1975.219  Signing of the ESA 
Convention was opened from May to December of 1975.  According to the rules of the 
document, “All ESRO States had to ratify to bring the Convention into force (Art. XXI).”220  
Sweden was the first to sign on April 6, 1976, and France was the last on October 30, 
1980.221   The ESC’s final meeting was in 1977, after which time the ESA assumed its 
predecessor’s role.222  
 There were two norm entrepreneurs which appeared in the final leg of the first stage 
of the norm life cycle which advocated a European approach to space activities.  The first to 
appear was the ESC, which acted in the capacity of an epistemic community.  The European 
Space Council essentially took the position that the existing European space institutions were 
not European enough.  ESRO, ELDO and (1960s-) CETS were each European institutions in 
their own rite, but there was a serious lack of coordination between the organizations (for 
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which the ESC was created to address223).  Each institution behaved outwardly as Europe, but 
differing interests between the organizations made for multiple Europes.  This was contrary 
to how the ESC thought European states ought to behave in space activities.  Initially, the 
ESC had a difficult time persuading European states, for the Causse and Puppi reports 
coincided with the rising national disputes regarding Europa, and attractive offers of 
assistance from the American program.  In truth, the second stage of norm development 
within ESRO had not yet failed.  There had been active debate surrounding the utility of 
ESRO,224 but debate did not come to a conclusion as it had for ELDO.  The ESC, however, 
was attempting to end ESRO’s second stage by claiming ESRO’s brand of European 
behavior did not go far enough.  Initially, this claim fell on deaf ears, but the ESC’s 
conclusions had reinforced the convictions one very important state – France. 
 France acted as a norm entrepreneur which enjoyed an advantage most entrepreneurs 
do not – the power of coercion.  The French took a risk and threatened to withdraw from the 
otherwise successful ESRO if their demands for greater European coherency in space were 
not met.  The French move increased the agency of the ESC, which after 1970, became 
responsible for preventing European space cooperation from collapsing.  The Council applied 
the lessons of ESRO and ELDO to adjust the structure and rules of the existing space 
institutions.  Many of the most successful constitutive rules present in ESRO were extended 
to the new European Space Agency.  Juste retour stayed on as the space industrial agreement 
between member states, and the practice of distributing facilities was carried over into the 
ESA Convention as well.  The important innovation inspired by ELDO was the distinction 
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between mandatory and optional projects.  Structurally, ELDO had collapsed on its own, and 
its assets were combined with ESRO’s.  The significant change in structure was the 
agreement to coordinate rather than continue to integrate national programs.225 
 The ESC had succeeded in halting ESRO’s norm cycle by discrediting it as 
insufficient.  However, it replaced the space science process with its own, and picking up the 
pieces of ELDO, initiated a final first stage to persuade European states to adopt a reformed 
version of the appropriateness of the European approach to space.  By 1973, the tipping point 
had been reached.  Fifteen years of persuasive (and coercive) efforts among norm 
entrepreneurs including Amaldi, Auger, (late 1950s-) Britain, France and the European Space 
Council resulted in the stable adoption of the idea that European states ought to proceed as 
Europe in space activities.  While national programs had actually been enhanced by the ESA 
Convention,226 the net effect was an increase in the European character of member state 
activities.  In addition to the mandatory projects, which required frequent cross-border 
interactions among member, the new constitutive rules of ESA worked to prevent overlap 
between national projects.227  The work of one member increased the collective knowledge of 
all members.  Each European achievement added yet another layer to a common European 
history, further legitimizing the identity of “we Europeans.” 
 With European space activities finally institutionalized in a single, stable 
organization, the process of socialization among other states and society was free to 
commence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: European space policy and norm socialization 
Since the foundation of ESA, European space institutions have slowly but surely 
socialized the idea that the appropriate approach to space science for European states is as 
Europeans.  The historical narrative of the ESA experience shows evidence of this 
socialization, as new states have willingly conformed to ESA standards in order to join the 
organization.  Recent attempts to make ESA relevant to the everyday European have moved 
the European approach towards the third stage of internalization.  The more banal European 
activity becomes, the greater it becomes taken for granted. 
 
ESA burns brightly 
Many of ESA’s early activities were defined by a push towards independence in 
spaceflight.  Europe’s contribution to the American-led Space Station Freedom (SSF), the 
scientific research module Columbus, intended to achieve just this in the field of manned 
space flight.  Still lacking the necessary technical experience, however, Europe looked again 
to America to help close the gap. 
From the start of America’s post-Apollo program, NASA intended the Space Shuttle 
and an orbital Space Station to have a symbiotic relationship with each other.  The Shuttle 
would build the Space Station, and the Space Station’s activities would justify the Shuttle.228  
The resources available to NASA, however, only permitted one to be built at a time.  Thus, 
when the shuttle was complete, and had been in successful operation for three years, the call 
to build a space station was expected.229  The Americans wanted the Space Station to be an 
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international project very early in its conception.  Not only would it avoid needless 
duplication in Europe, but it would improve America’s cooperative credentials and reduce 
the costs of development.230  
President Reagan committed the country to the Space Station in 1984, which he 
named Freedom.  Almost immediately, the Europeans were invited to participate.231  ESA 
was initially enthusiastic about cooperating with the Americans on Space Station Freedom 
(SSF).  In 1984, “ESA had due cause to feel optimistic about the future.  The first of the 
French-led Ariane rockets was now launching satellites on a commercial basis, a West 
German scientist had flown on the first Spacelab mission, and France had started work on a 
larger rocket to launch the Hermes space plane.  Europe’s strategic plan to be the third player 
in human spaceflight seemed to be on track.  Participation in the station was regarded as an 
ideal means of addressing the learning curve.”232  The Europeans headed into SSF with a full 
head of steam. 
The West Germans and the Italians drew up a proposal for the ESA Council for 
Europe to build a scientific module, which they named Columbus.  Having recently come off 
a positive experience with Spacelab, the Germans and Italians were fully behind the 
project.233  The Rome meeting of ESA European Ministers officially confirmed ESA’s 
intention to take part in the American-led space station.234  Perhaps the primary motivation 
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behind ESA’s support for Columbus was its long term ambitions for independence in manned 
space flight.  Columbus, for ESA,  
“was only part of a much wider programme being developed by ESA and the more 
enthusiastic member governments to give Europe total autonomy in manned and 
unmanned space activities by the end of the century.  The Columbus programme was 
one of three pillars of this scheme, the other two being a radically redesigned Ariane 
rocket and a mini-space shuttle, Hermes, to give European astronauts independent 
access to space.”235   
This intention manifested in Columbus’ design.  Though the research module would start out 
attached to the station, and use its resources, “ESA stipulated that it might later detach it, in 
order to integrate it into an independent European facility.”236   
Progress on SSF and Columbus, however, came to a standstill due to several 
problems.  The loss of Challenger and subsequent grounding of the American space shuttle 
fleet cast doubts on whether the project would go forward at all.237  To make matters worse, 
the Department of Defense suddenly decided in 1986 that it wanted SSF to be available to the 
US military if it decided to conduct any national defense-related activities.  This was a 
problem with Europe, which liked neither the prospect their access to SSF could be limited 
by the DoD, nor that their organization, dedicated to peaceful pursuits, could be associated 
with military research.238  The issue was left half-resolved.  In 1988, the DoD agreed to 
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access to the station for any national defense activities that did not involve the testing of 
weapons.239  
Trans-Atlantic cooperation on SSF nearly broke down over station management 
issues.  In 1987, “the US government was proposing that while the station should be 
managed by a multilateral board including all interested parties, NASA should chair it and 
have the power to make decisions where a consensus could not be achieved.  This amounted 
to giving NASA the right to override European and Japanese objections on use of the 
station.”240  The Europeans were prepared to allow NASA to handle emergencies, but wanted 
all decisions to be made by consensus.  This problem, too, was left in the air, with all parties 
agreeing to continue on a basis of “genuine partnership.”241   
As the Cold War came to a close, so too did much of the American rationale for SSF.  
The end of the 1980s saw the Americans in a budget shortfall, and financial constraints 
forced constant redesigns of the station,242 which, inexorably, forced redesigns for Columbus 
as well. 
Structural changes in the American space program as it began to pursue a space 
station opened up opportunities for ESA to expand its own structure.  Although conflicts over 
communications satellites had been an irritant to the US-European relationship, Spacelab had 
been positive, and there was still a great deal ESA could learn from NASA.  European states 
decided it was in the national and European interest to continue cooperating with America, 
though this time they would approach the US as a single agency, rather than as individual 
states.  The European approach to space activities had been re-adopted by ESA member 
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states, and for the first time in the history of European space history, commitment to that 
norm appeared stable.  The norm life cycle had entered its second stage under a unitary 
organization, and interactions with NASA served to push the debate surrounding future 
coordination in the direction of internalization. 
Once again, Europeans found themselves in a conflict over rules that were 
constitutive to cooperation.  Although the conflict’s resolution ended up favoring the 
American position, NASA had again succeeded in reinforcing the idea that Europe was best 
off providing for itself where possible.  The deepening of America’s categorization of 
“other” had a positive effect on the socialization of the appropriateness of “Europe” because 
it demonstrated that only a European approach could fulfill European state interests.  
European collective identity benefited as well from the early accomplishments and ambitions 
of ESA.  The success of Ariane and Spacelab coupled with the ambitious designs for 
Columbus were cause for excitement for the potential benefits to European reputation.  The 
list of common European experiences which could be used to invent a mythos of European 
identity grew considerably. 
 
ESA “harmonization” and expansion 
In contrast to the experience of ELDO and ESRO, the pattern of integration among 
European space states slowed, and was replaced by a process of increased coordination under 
ESA.  Article II of the ESA Convention stated: “The purpose of the Agency shall be to 
provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European 
States in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their 
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being used for scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems.”243  Short 
of seeking a unified space policy, ESA chose to “harmonize.”244  “Although the work of ESA 
represent[ed] a significant contribution to the European integration process, the Agency itself 
[was] not engaged in the process of integration as such.  Rather, its purpose [was] the 
harmonization of European policies, so as to avoid unnecessary overlap or duplication of 
effort, while making possible larger-scale projects that would be beyond the resources of any 
single state.”245  In 1980, Erik Quistgaard, the ESA Director General of the time, proposed 
some main operating principles for the Agency.  While he believed ESA should primarily 
behave as a research and development organization, he also believed it should coordinate 
national efforts to avoid redundancy, and chose projects that were helpful to European 
industry in general.246  
ESA institutionalized several mechanisms meant to anticipate and prevent conflicts of 
state interests, and in so doing, preserved them.  The differentiation between “mandatory” 
and “optional” projects gave member states some choice in which projects they would 
pursue, while maintaining a worthwhile core program.  The mandatory programs, the core of 
the Agency’s activities, consisted chiefly of the scientific projects, and the cost of common 
facilities and administration.247  The required contribution from each member state was a 
function of their GNP.248  Particularly for the larger member states, the amount spent on the 
mandatory programs was only a fraction of their total expenditures.  Most of their resources 
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were spent on the “optional,” or purely national programs.  The optional activities 
mechanism was an extension of the “package deal” arrangements provided for by the ESC 
after the ESRO/ELDO crisis, circa 1970.  The optional activities typically consisted of 
payload projects, such as application satellites, or the Ariane rockets, which only a minority 
of member states chose to partake in.249  
Beyond preventing members from having to pay for projects they did not care to 
support, the Agency found the optional projects “allowed a form of ‘market’ culture to 
develop, whereby Member States regularly haggle[d] among themselves, trading industrial 
interests in proposed programmes against financial stakes placed by their fellows.”250  The 
optional programs were the chief activities among ESA members, making up roughly 80% of 
the space expenditures among the member states.251  
While there were fears that allowing optional programs would drive space activities 
back to the state level, the opposite has been observed.  “The proliferation of optional 
programs has, nevertheless, made ESA a very lively and enterprising organization, and, 
somewhat paradoxically, has reinforced the cohesion of its Member States.”252  The optional 
programs permitted the member states to pursue their interests, while providing for an 
international option among states who sought similar avenues of research or application.253  
ESA’s mandatory programs were intended to compliment, not compete with national 
projects, and vice versa.254  
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ESA has acceded seven countries since the signing of its Charter.  The Agency has 
been faced with the dilemma of how it can expand its membership without sacrificing the 
efficacy of the original institution.255  The ESA Convention provided few mechanisms to 
guide the accession process.  While it made very clear that cooperation was encouraged, and 
would make ESA stronger, acceding new members would only be possible through 
unanimous consent of current members.256  This problems caused by a lack of accession rules 
became keenly apparent in 1999, when Portugal sought accession.  The past accesions of 
Norway and Austria, as well as the association of Finland in the 1980s and 1990s set the 
precedent that candidate countries would first don the status of “associate member” prior to 
accession, even though no such precondition existed in the ESA Charter.257  Portugal, in 
comparison, had cooperated in the past with ESA on space projects, but had never been an 
associate member.  Thus, when Portugal applied for full membership,  
“For the first time, a non-member State, which had no links with ESA via a 
Cooperation Agreement and was thus less familiar with Agency procedures and 
programmes, was making a ‘direct’ request to accede to the Agency – in full 
compliance, it must be said, with the terms of the ESA Convention.  This was bound 
to raise particular problems, especially regarding the inclusion of Portuguese firms in 
activities developed by the Agency and the application of industrial policy.”258   
ESA approved Portugal’s accession in 2000, though with concerns how Portugal would be 
integrated.259  
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To assuage concerns how the less developed country could be assimilated into the 
ESA framework and industrial policy, it was decided to have Portugal go through a 
probationary period, as Finland had in the past.260  For six years, the money Portugal paid 
towards mandatory programs would be kept separate from the general budget, and spent 
entirely on the development of Portuguese firms and infrastructure.  At the end of the six 
years, Portugal would theoretically have caught up with the established ESA countries.  At 
that time, it would be afforded equal access to the common scientific programs, and could 
benefit from juste retour.261  Many of the expansion countries sought membership in ESA for 
the same reasons that small countries in the past became a part of ESRO and ELDO.  
Hungary, for example, wished to join ESA in part to stem the brain drain the Agency and 
other programs abroad were having on its nationally-produced scientists.262   
In 1999, Hungary, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic were refused entry as 
members into ESA based on their inability to pay into the mandatory programs.263  Each had 
a history of cooperation with ESA, however, and so in order to avoid alienating them, and 
leaving the possibility for accession open to the future, ESA created a “European 
Cooperating State” (ECS) status.  Each of the four countries became eligible for this status 
when the denotation was approved in 2001.264  Hungary and the Czech Republic would 
quickly adopt the designation. 
Luxembourg and Greece followed the established precedent set by Norway and 
Austria, and made their accession processes easier.  In September 2000, Luxembourg signed 
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a Cooperation Agreement with ESA265 as did Greece, which signed in January, 2001.266  
They were both accepted as full members in July, 2004.267  2005 was a busy year for ESA 
membership solicitations.  By the time Poland and Romania had concluded negotiations to 
become Cooperating States, Hungary officially applied to become a full member, and Latvia 
and Slovakia each sent representatives seeking possibilities for greater cooperation.268  
Poland became a Cooperating State officially in 2007.269   
A persistent barrier to ESA’s expansion was the less-developed state of candidate 
countries’ telecommunications infrastructure.  The “digital divide” referred to inequities in 
telecommunications capacity between ESA and its potential “enlargement states.”270  For 
example, unequal access to the Internet might constitute one such divide.  The Agency 
believed this posed a significant problem.  The ESA Bulletin noted the difficultly the Agency 
had meeting the requests for increased cooperation among “expansion states.”  The 
arrangements, they argued, “set up before the accession of those countries to the EU, might 
quickly prove to be inadequate; some countries are already finding them too complex, and 
for others the cooperation they offer is too restrictive.”271  
 The recent expansion of ESA is perhaps the strongest evidence available to suggest 
the norm life cycle in Europe is currently undergoing the process of socialization.  According 
to Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s model, the second stage is characterized by the expansion of 
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the norm to new states who adopt the idea without having been coerced.272  This has been 
observed in Europe.  The candidate expansion states willingly conformed to the standards for 
behavior among existing ESA states under the belief that behaving as part of Europe was in 
their national interest. 
 The constitutive elements which made this expansion feasible extend back to the 
formative years of ESA.  A string of constitutive rule changes influenced by ESA’s 
experiences constructed the present-day expansion policy.  The ESA Convention’s emphasis 
on coordination over integration among member states facilitated the expansion of the 
Agency’s structure, for instead of having to incorporate expansion states into the full extent 
of ESA’s activities, it had only to integrate new members into its mandatory programs.  
These projects composed only 20% of European space states’ expenditures.273 
 The lack of prescriptive rules provided in the ESA Convention, and the positive 
results which came from the process used to induct Norway and Austria led to the ECS rules 
now used as the standard for state accession.  The ECS pathway to accession has been a 
positive influence for the socialization of the appropriateness of “Europe” because it 
delineated a concrete method for conforming to ESA-sponsored norms.  The recent spate of 
applications for full and associate membership to the Agency may owe in part to the clear 
roadmap for induction provided by ESA’s constitutive rules. 
 The policy of “harmonization” has also been productive for the socialization of the 
European approach to space activities among existing members.  The stability it has 
produced in ESA for 34 years has pushed the European approach towards internalization, as 
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each passing year has made ESA’s standards for European behavior more banal.  Norm 
internalization occurs when the norm becomes so uncontroversial that debate over its 
appropriateness ceases to occur.274  For the younger generations, ESA’s European approach 
is all they have ever known in a space institution.  Without the development of a serious 
failure in cooperation owing to the policy of harmonization, coordination of European state 
policies for the good of Europe may become implicit as young people grow up to become 
policy-makers.  At that point, stage three in the norm life cycle shall have been achieved. 
 
The end of the Cold War and the evolution of European interests 
When the Cold War came to an end, European priorities began to change.  As the 
global security situation improved, and ESA became more confident in its own abilities, the 
Agency became less concerned with independence in all aspects of space flight.  Instead, it 
chose to pursue a limited set of priorities it believed were relevant to a stronger Europe.  
While ESA remained a highly successful organization, it lost some of the sense of “other” 
present during the Cold War.   
Whereas in the past, ESA actively compared itself to the US and the Soviets, and 
acted on the behalf of Europe to close the technological gap with its competitors, more 
recently, ESA has not perceived the remaining gap in space technology between Europe and 
the United States as problematic.  Indeed, the Agency seems to consider reliance upon the 
Americans and Russians for European manned space flight to be acceptable for the time 
being.275  ESA is confident it will one day possess an independent manned program, though 
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it does not currently place priority on that goal.276  Other European space policy areas exhibit 
a similar diminished urgency.  Take, for example, the history of Columbus following the 
close of the Cold War.   
In 1992, prospects for the American-side of the Space Station were looking bleak.  
After several years of redesigns, nothing had actually been built.277  Frustrated with the 
mounting cost of redesigns, the lack of progress, and their junior-status with respect to 
NASA, the Europeans began to seriously consider combining Columbus with the Russian 
Mir 2 rather than with Freedom.278  It is interesting to consider what might have developed, 
but these negotiations were halted later in 1993, when the Americans put an end to that 
avenue by signing a deal with the Russians themselves.  Mir 2 would become part of a 
redesigned space station also involving the Europeans and the Japanese.279 The station was 
renamed Alpha to reflect involvement of those President Reagan originally intended to 
rival.280  The Russo-American agreement did little to ingratiate NASA with Europe, who was 
circumvented completely in the process.281 
Entering the 1990s, both the Americans and the Europeans were tightening their belts 
due to an economic slowdown.  ESA made a series of cutbacks in 1993 to save money.  
Hermes, which was to be the European equivalent to the Space Shuttle, was eliminated 
entirely.282  Though Columbus remained, it was scaled down significantly so that it could be 
launched on an Ariane rocket.  The ability of Columbus to detach from the space station and 
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become part of its own European station was abandoned, effectively making it a permanent 
science module on ISS.283  The changes surrounding Columbus “represented a redirection of 
the agency’s long-term strategy, which had previously been geared towards achieving 
independence.”284  
Europeans, particularly the French, quickly became impatient with the station, 
referred to after 1993 as the International Space Station (ISS).285  Although the French made 
it clear they would have preferred to cut off their funding for the project, they did stay on for 
sake of being “good Europeans.”286  Reimar Lust287 shared the French position in 1995, 
indicating he felt ISS could “only be justified in political terms, not really by itself.  No 
convincing concept for its utilization [had] as yet been developed.”288  
Whether it was simply for the sake of cooperation, or something else, Congress kept 
the project alive, and so too did the international partners.  In fact, it was the Italians who 
saved the day in 2001 by putting up the funds to complete the station’s habitation module.289  
Clearly, some value had been placed on ISS, which managed even to survive the tragic loss 
of Columbia in 2003.290  Indeed, as part of its Annual Report in 2003, ESA, despite the loss 
of Columbia, placed its resolve behind completion of the station.  The rationale, however, 
had changed somewhat from 1995.  Instead of maintaining just a political relationship with 
cooperating states, ESA wished to exploit the scientific potential of Columbus for 
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commercial and educational purposes.291  With the Soviet threat diminished, and the 
European Union beginning to catch up with America economically, ESA reformed its 
relevance to Europe in terms of security, but in a manner completely foreign to its Cold War 
conception.  
In the past, ESA was building a better future for Europe by catching up to its 
technologically superior rivals.  Today, it attempts to build a better future for Europe through 
the creation and distribution of information.  It eliminates threats to “European citizens” 
through increased understanding.  For example, “global security” has been taken to mean 
environmental security – “promoting a clean and safe environment for Earth and human 
activities.”292  The ability to produce and transmit information is seen to have “strategic value 
for the development of nations and regions.”293  In space policy, this has been expressed as 
an increased focus on global observation.  The use of satellites to understand, predict and 
mitigate the effects of atmospheric and geological phenomena on humans has consumed 
much of ESA’s resources.294  
“At their 2001 Summit in Gothesburg, the EU Heads of State and Government 
requested that ‘the Community contribute to establishing by 2008 a European capacity for 
global monitoring for environment and security (GMES).”295  GMES essentially provided the 
ability to observe and collect data on a broad range of natural phenomena, which has been 
used to abate risk for dangers of air quality, forest fires, food security, and other humanitarian 
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crises.296  Natural disaster management was a big theme in a year 2000 meeting discussing 
the contemporary applications of the “Outer Space Treaty,”297 and continues to be a focal 
point of contemporary European space policy in the status quo.   
 Recent European space activities have continued to socialize the European approach 
to space policy, though in ways different compared to the past.  The end of the Cold War had 
several constitutive impacts on both NASA and ESA.  The global political structure 
transformed from a competitive multi-polar configuration to a stable American-led system, 
which altered American and European interests in space activities.  For the Americans, there 
was a reduced interest in committing the same levels of finance to a space station conceived 
in a Cold War context.  For ESA, the reduced scope of SSF, conflicts over the rules of 
conduct for the station, a dragging economy and a reduced need for independence in all 
aspects of space flight led ESA to conclude the competitive spirit which hatched Columbus 
was no longer in Europe’s interest.   
 Instead, Europe reinterpreted its interests as the pursuit of information in the name of 
environmental security and general knowledge.  ESA altered its structure according to these 
interests, transforming the focus of its projects from increasing technological capability for 
sake of matching the US to pursuing applications that could pursue their new interests.  
ESA’s older commitments were altered to fit this behavior change as well.  Columbus 
transformed from a pathway to European orbital station independence to a font of scientific 
knowledge.    
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 The new direction of ESA contributes to the second stage of norm development by 
making ESA projects a part of daily European life.  According to Director Dordain, the 
recent spate of applications satellites and pure science projects has been intended to reach 
past the state all the way down to the level of the European individual.298  Presumably, the 
intent is to make ESA information products such a banal part of European everyday existence 
that citizens could not imagine life without the products of European endeavors.  Whether 
this strategy will make the appropriateness of the European approach to third stage of its 
norm cycle has yet to be seen, but it seems to be pushing in the right direction. 
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CONCLUSION: Exploring the future of European collective identity 
The central argument of this thesis has been that a constructivist analysis of European 
space policy history suggests that the promotion of a European approach to space activities 
among European states has contributed to the construction of a European collective identity.  
The norm that European states ought to behave as “Europe” has reached the second of three 
stages in Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s model for the life cycle of a norm where the norm has 
been adopted among states, but has not yet become so uncontroversial as to be taken for 
granted. 
Chapter three applied the first stage of the norm life cycle model to European space 
policy by detailing the emergence of the idea that European states ought to behave as 
Europeans in their approach to space activities.  The time period considered to contain the 
complete first stage of the norm life cycle was in fact composed of multiple starts and stops 
for the appropriateness of the European approach.  As two separate European space 
institutions promoting essentially the same norm for different reasons, both ELDO and 
ESRO had their own bounded norm cycles with separate tipping points and varied successes 
in socializing the standards for behavior established by their respective Conventions.  Time 
revealed the weaknesses of both institutions, and to correct for them, a new set of norm 
entrepreneurs emerged to persuade European states to adopt the same norm under a stronger 
structure and set of constitutive rules.  Though the norm life cycle models a linear 
progression of norm development, the non-linear progression of events witnessed in the 
history of European space policy arguably does not breach the overarching pattern of norm 
development.  Constructivism leads us to the understanding that the elements constituting a 
historical process are complex and reflexive.  The fact there would be multiple iterations in 
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the attempt to internalize a common approach to policy among a set of states as 
heterogeneous as those found in Europe is not so surprising.  
Chapter four measured the progress of common behavior among European states and 
found that by the standards of the norm life cycle model, socialization among states and 
society is proceeding well.  The ratification of the ESA Convention ushered in a period of 
institutional stability that has persisted to this day.  The implementation of ESA’s European 
approach to space policy was successful enough to persuade multiple states to conform to 
ESA standards for behavior and seek accession into the organization.  This pattern of norm 
conformance, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, indicates that the socialization is 
proceeding in the direction of internalization.  While European poll figures and the continued 
debate over the future of European coordinated policy seems to indicate the threshold of the 
third stage in norm growth has yet to be broken, recent trends in ESA behavior seem to 
indicate it is moving in a direction that will extend the benefits of European behavior to the 
level of the individual.  If ESA can make its information products an integral part of 
European daily life, it stands a good chance of ending the debate in favor of truly European 
behavior. 
The lingering question, which constructivism unfortunately cannot answer, is when 
will the socialization of the European approach become internalized?  The norm life cycle 
model gives only limited clues as to when this might be.  According to Finnemore and 
Sikkink, internalization is preceded by a wave of conformance to the norm, instigated 
(perhaps) by peer pressure among states or strong esteem benefits.299  Europe has certainly 
seen a great deal of conformance, but the concept of “Europe” remains controversial all the 
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same.  As with many processes, patience is advised.  Socialization is occurring.  Given the 
strong history of nationalism in Europe, perhaps it should not be surprising that the process 
of European socialization would span a generation or more.  There has been significant 
progress.  The effect of the European approach to state behavior has translated into European 
identity among individuals; and while this often manifests as a secondary identity, that at 
least half of Europeans consider themselves in some part “European” is significant.  The 
reason why those numbers climbed so quickly early on, but have remained stable for the last 
15 years is somewhat difficult to explain.  Though mass popular conformance to a norm is 
not expected until stage three of the norm life cycle, where did the already considerable 
numbers of self-identified Europeans come from?   Several questions remain, and future 
iterations of research on a similar topic could benefit from specific improvements. 
The historical narratives which provided the bulk of evidence throughout the paper 
were heavily reliant upon secondary sources of historical data.  This paper is deeply indebted 
to the ESA Publications and History departments, as their information has been most illusory 
to understanding of the space institution.  However, it would be superior to refer instead to 
the primary documents that were used to create the ESA history texts so that there would be 
fewer filters in the interpretation of the political side of European space history.  This would 
require a trip to Paris, where ESA headquarters are located, as many of these primary 
documents have not yet been digitized. 
An increased exploration into the role the Soviets and Russians had on European 
space policy development could be illuminating.  Though it is appropriate to characterize 
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American involvement with the Europeans as heavier than Soviet or Russian historically,300 
Russia has been an important service provider for Europe throughout the space age.  France 
cooperated with the USSR on satellite construction as early as 1966.301  The Soviets and 
French again collaborated in 1982, when Jean-Loup Chrétien was taken to space as part of a 
Soyuz mission.302  More recently, ESA and the Russian Space Agency have begun to work 
much closer together, signing a deal in 2005 to share a common launchpad in Kourou, and to 
collaborate on future rocket designs.303  Soviet influence in the past and Russian cooperation 
into the future likely has some impact which has not been accounted for here.  
 The extent to which European space policy will influence the direction of European 
identity is uncertain indeed.  The task of persuading European states to take a European 
approach in space matters has gone well, but will this translate into similar thinking among 
European individuals?  As the initial attempts at a European approach in the 1960s suggest, 
there are hazards to such a complicated task as coordinating a large pool of self-interested 
states.  While ESA has managed to achieve this for some time, unforeseen events or 
pressures could easily throw the Agency’s progress off track.   
Whether or not European collective identity is ever realized, the constitutive effects 
of the process experienced to date invites continued study and theorizing with regards to 
what lies beyond the nation-state.   
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